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GRADE 
Resu men: Este trabajo reseña algunos desarrollos recientes 
en la literatura sobre política económica, ponien-
do énfasis en la relación existente entre elec-
ciones y política macroeconómica. Se destaca 
también que a pesar de los grandes avances en el 
área, aún quedan muchos problemas por resolver. 
En particular, los aspectos normativos y empí-
ricos requieren con urgencia de más estudios. 
Abstract: This paper reviews recent developments in the 
literature of economic policy-making. It focuses 
in particular on the relation between elections 
and macroeconomic policy. It should also be 
noted that in spite of tremendous advances in 
the area, there are still many important unre-
solved issues. In particular, both the normative 
and empirical areas are the ones in most urgent 
need of study. 
1. Introduction 
In the last few years, we have seen interesting developments in the theory of 
economic policy. Economic policy is no longer considered to be the result 
of some exogenous process, but rather the rational decision of a policymaker 
who has an objective function and who is engaged in a strategic interaction 
with the electorate. In this context, the time consistency problem of economic 
policy has been the dominating topic.
1 Recently, many researchers have 
studied the scope and relevance of this problem for fiscal and monetary policy, 
and a variety of suggestions have been made. 
* I am very thankful to Ken Rogoff and Carlos Urzüa for their continuous advice 
and help. Obviously, I am responsible for all omissions or errors. 
1 See Rogoff (1987) for a survey on this topic. 
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Other researchers, taking a different tack, have further explored the 
objectives and incentives of the policymakers and, by doing so, have redis-
covered the political-economic models. Indeed, in most democratic societies, 
policymakers are elected officials who have to face elections on a regular basis. 
Because of this, the objectives and incentives of these policymakers are af-
fected by their interest in being reelected. Moreover, since policymakers tend 
to favor their constituencies, they also tend to be partisan. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the most recent developments in 
this area. In order to avoid a long discussion, I center my attention on those 
works that have been the most influential. I also deal with some of the issues 
that require further analysis. It should be noted that most of the theoretical 
models I will discuss are positive in the sense that they are constructed to 
explain some observed empirical regularities. However, a few of them can be 
usefully applied to study normative issues such as the optimal design and 
reform of political and economic institutions. 
This paper is organized as follows: First, I review the partisan theory of 
economic cycles. Next, I introduce the influence groups approach to the theory 
of economic policy. After that I briefly review the literature on electoral policy 
cycles. Then, I present some issues on elections in open economies. Finally, I 
review some of the unresolved issues still remaining in this area. 
2. Partisan Theories of Economic Cycles 
It has long been argued that policymakers tend to implement macroeconomic 
policies to favor their constituencies. For instance, Hibbs (1977), based on 
some observations about the American and British economies, postulated that 
political parties have different preferences regarding the unemployment-
inflation combination. More precisely, he argues that the unemployment rate 
(inflation rate) is lower (higher) under a liberal (Democratic or Labor) ad-
ministration than under a conservative (Republican or Conservative) one. 
Behind Hibbs' argument, there is a stable Phillips curve that can be readily 
exploited by different policymakers. Moreover, each unemployment-inflation 
combination has a different effect over income distribution: a low unemploy-
ment-high inflation combination tends to reduce income inequality; in con-
trast, a high unemployment-low inflation combination tends to increase 
income inequality. Alt (1985) studies 14 Western industrial countries during 
the 1960-1983 period. He finds that changes of political parties in the govern-
ment display some of the effects suggested by Hibbs. 
Obviously, Hibbs' argument can not be sustained in the context of the 
recent rational expectations models where there is no possibility of an exploitable 
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yields some (but not all) of the empirical "regularities" discussed by Hibbs. 
In Alesina's model, the electoral uncertainty of which political party is going 
to be elected to office causes a short-lived unemployment-inflation trade-off 
only in election years. To make this more precise, we will now briefly discuss 
a simplified version of the model. 
2.1. Alesina's Model 
Alesina analyzes an intertemporal two-party model. He argues that political 
parties are different because they pursue the economic interest of different 
constituencies. Because of this, policymakers with different political affilia-
tions would generally differ in their macroeconomic policy choices. 
Alesina's model is a two party version of the Barro-Gordon (1983) model. 
The two parties are called party D (for Democratic) and party R (for 
Republican) respectively. Each political party's preferences are given by: 
W'=5>t/(y,,n,) (1) 
( = 0 
where ie{D,R\, 
7i( = rate of inflation, 
y,= rate of growth of real output, 
6= discount factor, p € (0,1). 
Thus, political parties have preferences regarding the rate of growth of real output 
and the inflation rate. Here the rate of growth of real output is a proxy for the 
rate of unemployment. This is so since, by Okun's Law, growth and un-
employment are inversely related. In order to further simplify matters, let 
V(y,,«,) = \f, - (n, - Tl')
2] / 2 , (2) 
where V is a constant, r\
D > r\
R = 0 . So that the R party's inflation bliss point 
is smaller than that of the D party. 
The structure of the economy is very simple and can be represented by 
an expectations augmented aggregate supply curve (EAS). This curve is the 
result of some rigidities in the labor market: workers sign non-contingent 
labor contracts yearly. Elections (if any) take place after the labor contracts 
have been signed. Therefore, the only source of uncertainty is the electoral 
outcome itself; more concretely, the economic policies that the new govern-
ment will follow. The EAS curve is given by the following expression: 
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where y* = "natural" output rate of growth, 
x = constant, xe (0,1), 
7tf = expected rate of inflation. 
Thus, the output rate of growth of the economy will differ from its natural 
level only when the expected rate of inflation is different from the actual one. 
In the absence of reputational effects, we can simplify party ;'s problem, 
in off-election years, to the following static problem:
2 
max{[v* + T(7t, - Ttf)]
2 - [71, - n']
2} 12. (4) 
Here, 7tf is taken as given. The first order condition for this problem requires 
that 
T/+T
2(7C,-7Tf)-(71,-^ = 0 . (5) 
Moreover, the second order condition is readily satisfied since x
2 < 1 . In a 
rational expectations equilibrium, the following must be true 
7Tf = 7t, . 
Using this expression in (5), we obtain: 
TT; = XV* + TV" ; ie {D,/f} . (6) 
This equation describes the workers' rational expectation of the inflation rate 
in off-election years (given that party i is in office). 
If / is an election period, workers are uncertain about the electoral outcome. 
Suppose voters assign a probability P that party D would be elected; then the 
voters' rational expectation of the inflation rate is: 
7cf = x/ + Pn
fl. (7) 
Next, suppose that party / is elected into office; then the optimal inflation rate 
that this party would choose is given by: 
_ fx/ + (1 - -z
2P)r\
Di (1 - x
2) for i = D 
n, ~ jTy« _ (x2p)nD, (j _ T2) otherwise.
 W 
2 We assume that an administration can effectively control the inflation rate. This 
is a shortcut commonly used in this kind of model. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS 177 
Expression (8) differs from (6) because the electoral uncertainty is affecting 
voters' expectations of the inflation rate. 
In summary this model predicts that in off-election years, the real output 
rate of growth does not depend on which party is in office, so that 
y,+i=y* • 
Moreover, it predicts that the inflation rate is higher under a D administration 
than under an R administration 
This model also predicts that in election years, there will be an expansion 
under a D administration and a recession under a R administration, thus 
_iv* + T(l_P)Tlo/(l_T2) {ori = D  
y,~\y*-x(l +TVTV°/(1 -T
2) otherwise. 
From expression (8), it is clear that a D administration is always more infla-
tionary than an R administration. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that 
7t? >7r?+1>7t«+1>7t? . 
One undesirable feature of Alesina's model is the assumption that P is 
exogenously given. Alesina (1988b) recognizes this problem and makes the 
determination of P endogenous. In order to accomplish this, he assumes that 
voters' indirect utility function (which is similar to that of the political parties) 
is stochastic. In particular, he assumes that each voter's inflation bliss point, 
n , is a random variable with known cumulative probability function, F(T|), 





D < n''. Under these conditions, Alesina shows that each voter 
would choose, at election time, the party that has an T| closest to his own. 
Moreover, in this context, policy convergency is not possible.
3 
Alesina and Sachs (1988) and Alesina (1989) present evidence in favor of 
this theory. Alesina and Sachs focus their study on the U.S. case. In contrast, 
Alesina (1989) presents evidence for 12 industrialized countries (including the 
U.S.). These two studies find evidence that macroeconomic fluctuations are 
3 Alesina also shows that if the interaction between voters and political parties is 
modeled as an infinitely repeated game, complete or partial policy convergency may 
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associated with changes of the political party in office. Moreover, they find 
that left-wing parties tend to be more expansionary than their counterparts 
from the right-wing only in the early part of their tenure in office. 
2.2. Weakness of Alesina's Model 
Elsewhere, Rogoff (1988) discusses some of the theoretical and empirical 
limitations of Alesina's model. At a theoretical level, Rogoff finds the follo-
wing problems: 
0 The timing at which contracts are signed seems unnatural in a world 
with rational agents. Indeed, voters can benefit from signing their labor 
contracts after the electoral outcomes are known. 
it) By assuming a fixed number of political parties, Alesina avoids 
elaborating on a theory that would explain why other political parties cannot 
appear in the system. 
Some other deficiencies in Alesina's framework are the following: 
0 Partisan fiscal policy is not considered. By design, the Barro-Gordon 
model was constructed to address time-consistency problems in monetary 
policy. However, there is strong evidence that transfers, government expendi-
tures and taxes are frequently used to favor the incumbent's constituencies.
4 
I'O The assumption that political parties do not care about their political 
survival appears to be rather extreme. Political parties are flexible enough to 
locate themselves in a strategic position to increase their chances of being 
elected. 
Hi) The assumption that the incumbent has total control of the inflation 
rate needs some caution. In countries like the U.S.A. in which there is a 
relatively independent monetary authority, there is an important strategic 
interaction between the incumbent and the monetary authority that can lead 
to some surprising outcomes. Alesina (1988a) informally discusses how the 
independence of the monetary authority may reduce the level of political 
influence in the economy. Further complications appear in the case of an open 
economy where, as is well known, the money supply may be endogenously 
determined (depending upon the exchange rate regime). 
4 Hibbs and Dennis (1988) study the income distribution effects of partisan theory 
of macroeconomic policy. They point out two channels through which economic policy 
may affect income distribution: 
i) A global channel. Economic policy, by affecting cyclical economic activity, 
indirectly affects income distribution. 
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3. Theories of Pressure Groups 
This literature is related to the partisan theory of economic cycles. Here, it is 
assumed that economic policies are influenced by the efforts of individuals 
and economic groups aimed at furthering their specific economic interests. 
Competition among pressure or influence groups produces an equilibrium 
set of taxes, transfers, government expenditures, and other policies which are 
socially suboptimal. Moreover, the time and resources allocated to influence 
activities are wasteful for society. 
The main contributors in this area are Olson (1965), Krueger (1974), 
Becker (1983), and Brock and Magee (1984), among others. Initially, most 
of the attention in this area was focused on the issue of trade policy and 
protectionism. More recently, this focus has been shifted towards fiscal policy and 
economic growth. In this section, we briefly review these latest developments. 
It is assumed that pressure groups are powerful enough to influe-
electoral outcomes. For instance, Becker (1983) argues that voters are easy pre y 
for the different pressure groups since they have weak incentives to become 
informed about political issues. Indeed, voters realize that their individual 
actions have insignificant (if any) effects on electoral outcomes. Because of 
this, pressure groups can influence electoral outcomes through an effective 
useof (mis) information. Moreover, elected officials are assumed to implement 
the outcome of the competition among interest groups. Failure to do so would 
cause their removal from the government. 
3.1. A Model of Pressure Groups Competency 
This model is a modified version of Becker's (1983), and Brock and Magee's 
(1984) models. Assume that each individual's utility function is linear with 
respect to his/her real income. Assume also that there are two groups (A and 
B) in this society. Each of these groups is composed of and NB identical 
members, respectively. These two groups are pitted against each other in a 
fight for income distribution. One group has to pay taxes and the revenues of 
these taxes goes to the other group as transfers. 
Every period, each particular member of group A(B) receives an end -
ment of tA(zB) units of a final good. Moreover, each individual has a fixed 
time endowment of (p. This time endowment can be allocated into productive 
activities -or labor (L)- and redistributive activities (R). There is a lint-
technology to transform labor into final products, so that each unit of ia> 
produces wA(wB) units of the final good. Here, wA * wB . 
The amount of taxes (transfers) that a particular group pays (obtains) i 
determined by an influence function which depends on the redistributive (i.e 
lobbying) activities of each interest group. Thus 180 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
NAiA = MNARA, NfíRB) (9) 
and NfíxB = -A(NARA, NfíRB) , (10) 
where %A and T„ are lump-sum taxes or transfers per individual,
5 
A(.,.), the influence function, is a twice continuously differentiable 
function, and 
A,>0,A2<0,Au<0, and A22>0. 
From (9) and (10) it should be clear that we have a zero-sum game on income 
distribution. 
All the individuals that belong to each of the influence groups have the 
same common objectives; therefore, they constitute a team. Then, team A's 
problem is: 
max NA[E.A + wALA-x J 
s.t. NAlLA + RA] = NAy and (11) 
NAzA = A(NARA, NBRH) 
taking NHRB as given (Nash equilibrium). Similarly, team B's problem is 
max NB{EB + w^g - 1B] 
s.t. NB[LB + RB]=NB<p and (12) 
SB ^ A A ' ft 
taking NARA as given. 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, the first order conditions for 
the above problems are: 
wA = -Al(NARA,NBRB) (13) 
and = \*)(N^R^ »^f^Rg) . (14) 
Equation (13) is team A's reaction function and equation (14) is team B's 
reaction function. These two equations imply that individuals should allocate 
their time between labor and lobbying in such a way as to equalize their 
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marginal returns. Solving these two equations, we can determine /?* and R*B. 
Depending upon the values of NA and NB , the more productive team (that 
with a higher w) may end up allocating more of its time endowment to 
redistributive activities than to productive ones. For this reason, the levels of 
economic activity may suffer. Also, the more conflictive a society is, the less 
productive it becomes. 
In the analysis above, it is clear that influence activities affect the 
economic performance of a society. However, the macroeconomic effects of 
these activities are not yet clear. Brock and Magee (1984) - see also Magee, 
Brock and Young (1989) - provide a partial answer to this issue. They construct 
an intertemporal equilibrium model in which agents are locked in battle for 
income distribution. In this world, they find the following results: 
i) The wealthier an economy is, the higher the amount of resources 
allocated to redistributive activities. Wealth in their model is measured by the 
level of capital stock. 
if) The higher the wage rate is, the lower the time allocated to influence 
activities. 
Hi) In the long-run, there is no association between growth rates of the 
different macroeconomic variables and redistributive activities. 
This last result is a consequence of the assumption of exogenous technological 
change. 
In a closely related work, Terrones (1990) develops a dynamic macro-
economic model with influence activities and endogenous growth. In this 
model, economic growth results from the endogenous accumulation of 
human capital. Individuals allocate their time to the accumulation of human 
capital, to productive activities, and to influence activities. Individuals, by 
engaging in influence activities, affect the amount of transfers (direct and 
indirect) that the government makes to them; thus, the distribution of government 
transfers among different agents is endogenously determined. Clearly, agents 
are engaged in a dynamic non-cooperative game for income redistribution. 
In the context of this model, Terrones is able to show that influence or 
redistributive activities may have important effects on the short-run and 
long-run performance of an economy. In particular, the levels and rates of 
growth of output, consumption and capital (physical and human) are inversely 
related to the amount of influence activities in which economic agents engage. 
Moreover, the long-run behavior of the capital rental rate and skill-weighted 
wages are inversely related to these influence activities. As certain societies 
are more successful than others in generating conditions that take their 
members away from influence activities, the model predicts a complete 
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3.2. Weakness of the Pressure Croups Theory 
Obviously, the main problem of this theory is the lack of a more developed 
theory of voting behavior. The assumption that pressure groups can buy votes is 
not in keeping with the experience of most democratic societies. In most cases, 
voters do their homework because the economic costs of doing so are negligible. 
Another problem with this theory is the assumption that policymakers 
implement the outcomeof the competition between influence groups. Obviously, 
this is not necessarily so since policymakers may have their own objectives 
and incentives. Thus, influence groups have to look for ways if disciplining 
the policymakers. Evidently, the equilibrium one may get from considering 
all these factors may be d ifferent from the one predicted by the influence group 
theory. 
Finally, one would like to learn more about the microfoundations of the 
political influence function. Milgrom (1988) makes some progress in this 
direction. However, further work is necessary. 
4. Political Business Cycles 
The development of this theory is in the tradition of Schumpeter (1947), 
Downs (1957), Nordhaus (1975), and Tufte (1978). Downs (1957) postulated 
that political parties are mainly interested in winning elections. As a result, he 
argues that in a two party-system, parties choose the policies that are preferred 
by the median voter so that there is policy convergency. Clearly, these predic-
tions are in sharp contrast with those reached under the partisan theory 
previously discussed. 
Most people recognize that the performance of an economy has a major 
effect on the electoral fate of the incumbent government going for reelection. 
In these circumstances, it is expected that the incumbent would promote 
economic growth and stability at election time. Nordhaus (1975) constructed 
the first formal model that delivers these types of predictions and behavior 
of the incumbent. The model used by Nordhaus is composed of myopic 
economic agents and an exploitable Phillips curve. Under these conditions, 
the incumbent, regardless of his party affiliation, would always generate 
temporary booms at election time, thus generating political business cycles. 
Nordhaus' work, after enjoying a brief period of popularity and acceptance, 
was criticized theoretically since with the rational expectations revolution the 
major features of Nordhaus' model have become questionable. Moreover, 
only weak empirical evidence was found in favor of Nordhaus' model. This 
situation generated disenchantment in the area and, as a consequence, very 
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Recent research, using a game theoretical framework, has focused on the 
study of the strategic interaction of rational voters and the government 
incumbent. For instance, Ferejohn (1986) develops a dynamic model in which 
voters' strategies affect the incumbent's incentives, since it is assumed 
that voters base their voting behavior on evaluations of the incumbent's 
performance in office.
6 Therefore, voters may be able to motivate the incum-
bent not only to pursue his own objectives but, more importantly, the objec-
tives of the electors. Ferejohn shows that the strength of this influence weakens 
as a society becomes more heterogeneous. The problem with Ferejohn's 
analysis is that voting is retrospective and that the model he uses is not a 
macroeconomic model. 
More recently, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), 
and Rogoff (1990) have made significant contributions to our understanding 
of the design of economic policy in the context of democratic systems. In their 
view, political parties are managerial teams in charge of the provision of public 
goods and services. In this context, governments are characterized by their 
competence level in making timely decisions concerning economic policy. 
For instance, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) develop a model in which 
policymakers are distinguished by their ability to accurately forecast the 
future, and thus adequately set economic policy. In their model, voters prefer 
governments with better forecasting abilities because they produce higher 
welfare levels. Voters are rational, but they are uncertain about the state of the 
economy and the government's actions. In contrast, the government incum-
bent is better, but not fully, informed about the state of the economy. Moreover, 
the incumbent has no incentives to make this information public because he 
can benefit from it at election time, since voters use the welfare generated by 
the incumbent (during his tenure in office) as an indicator of his forecasting 
ability and thus future performance. Economic policy in this setup affects not 
only the present but also the future level of welfare. As a result, any incumbent 
facing an election would suboptimally set economic policy to increase the level 
of welfare in that period even at the cost of generating substantial losses of 
welfare during the following period. For this reason, a democracy is costly. It 
should be noted that the main limitation of Cukierman and Meltzer's analysis 
is the lack of a well-developed model economy. 
In Rogoff's (1990) -see also Rogoff and Sibert (1988)-analysis, different 
administrations are characterized by their competence in the provision of 
public goods and services. A competent administration delivers a higher 
amount of public goods at a lower cost (taxes) to private individuals. In these 
conditions, voters prefer competent administrations to incompetent ones. 
In Rogoff's model, there is a temporary information asymmetry about the 
6 This model resembles a dynamic principal-agent framework. See also Barro (1973). 184 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
incumbent's competence level. The incumbent learns about his own com-
petence level, which evolves stochastically, before he chooses economic 
policies and faces elections (when elections are due). In contrast, voters learn 
about the incumbent's competence only during the following period. As a 
result, any incumbent would generate political budget cycles in which taxes 
are set suboptimally low and government spending suboptimally high. The 
incumbent finances these budget deficits by reducing the level of public 
investment and (in some cases) by generating higher levels of inflation. What 
does the incumbent gain from behaving this way? The incumbent enjoys being 
in office, thus, at election time, he attempts to transfer his private information 
to voters: competent incumbents need to distinguish themselves in order to 
successfully face the electoral process.
7 Next, a stripped down version of 
Rogoff's (1990) model is discussed. 
4.1. A Simple Version of Rogoff's Model 
a) Preferences 
There is a large number of identical voters. At a given period, one of the voters 
is the leader of this society. Each voter's utility is assumed to be an increasing 
function of his consumption of private goods (c,) and public goods (g,). Thus, 
voters preferences are given by: 
f/, = (pc(+(.?F-K,?
2/2) (15) 
where 0 < (p < 1 and 0 < K < 1/2 , 
ct and gt > 0 . 
The incumbent (/) and the opposition candidate (O), who is drawn at random 
from the population, additionally derive ego rents (R) from being in office. 
Thus, they have the following preferences: 
Here, 1(i = I)= takes value one if the statement inside the parenthesis is true 
and zero otherwise, / e {/,0}. 
For simplicity, let's assume a two-period problem, so that / e {l, 2}. At the 
middle of the first period, the incumbent has to face mandatory elections. At 
the beginning of the second period, the winner of the election takes office. 
7 In this model, promises are not credible. Hence, a competent incumbent has an 
advantage over the opposition candidate: he has a record to make an impact on voters. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS 185 
With this timing convention, voters' expected discounted utility in period 1 
is then 
r, = £Xp'-'i/, 
[;=1 
where p is the subjective discount factor, 0 < p < 1, 
£{.}, is the conditional expectations operator. 
Voters condition their expectations with respect to their period 1 information set. 
Likewise, the incumbent's and the opposition candidate's expected dis-
counted utility in period 1, are 
\l 1 , , 
P|=E«' xp'~
lf/; • [iA as) 
where £' {.}, as above, is the conditional expectations operator. 
However, the incumbent's information set is different from the opposition 
candidate's and voters' information sets. 
b) Endowments and Technology 
Every period, each voter gets a fixed amount of a nonstorable good, y. A 
fraction, xf , of this endowment is used to pay lump-sum taxes, and' the 
remainder is consumed. Thus 
c, = y-r, . (19) 
The incumbent's only role is to provide public goods. Nobody else in this 
society can take up the leader's role until he is voted out of office. The 






where e,, is the incumbent's administrative competence and x and e are perfect 
substitutes in production. Moreover, the total level of g, is observable only 
after elections have been held. Competence is a stochastic characteristic that 
evolves as follows: 
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where a is an independent random variable with the following probability 
distribution: 
Moreover, a'<a
h and OQ is known. The competence of ah administration is 
modeled as a random variable to reflect the world changing conditions. 
Indeed, an administration could be fit to deal with certain kinds of problems 
but unfit to deal with others. 
c) Elections and Equilibrium in the. Full Information Case 
Elections take place at the end of period 1. If voters were able to observe the 
incumbent's competence level, their decision would be straightforward: 
reelect the incumbent only if his last competence shock, a , is rA This is so 
since their expected welfare level of keeping the incumbent in office is higher 
than the one they would obtain from electing the opposition candidate (who 
may have a competence shock of a
h only with a probability p). 
In order to see the above result, let's solve the incumbent problem as of 
period t. An /'-type incumbent (i.e. e| = <x,_, + a',, / e {l,h}) sets taxes, x,, to 
max W(x,, £',) = (p[ y - x,} + (t, + ej) - Kit, + e})
2 / 2 (22) 
The optimal level of taxes is then, 
T;(ei) = n-£; (23) 
where r\ = (1 - (p) / K » 0 .
8 
The level of welfare in period f, when the type i incumbent sets his optimal 
level of taxes, is 
t/;(ej) = (p(y+ ej) + (i - <p) / 2 . (24) 
Clearly, as ej it rises so does U*{.). 
Assume that a', , i e is observed in period t, then the / +1 voter's 




+1) + (l-(p)/2, (25) 
It is assumed that y> n. This assumption is helpful in ruling out extraneous results. MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS 187 
where e;°+, = pej*., + (1 - p)e'('+, . 
Moreover, Q° = pSl
h + (1 - p)Q' (26) 
is the expected welfare if the incumbent's type is not observed in period t. 
Obviously, Q
/1>Q°>Q'. 
d) Equilibrium in the Asymmetric Information Case 
Any incumbent in off-election periods finds it optimal to set taxes at their full 
information levels. This is so since there are no gains from deviating from these 
tax levels. However, this is not true for the case of an incumbent facing an 
election. Below we develop this case in more detail. 
The events in this economy have the following sequence: 
Period 1 Period 2 
Election 
I I 1 
a. Events repeat as in 1. 
Incumbent sets T, Voters observe g,. 
after learning a,. Voters learn a,. 
Voters observe T,. Winner takes office. 
I" 
Nature: a, 
Thus, at the beginning of each period, nature determines the incumbent's 
latest competency shock a,, t e {1,2}- There is a probability p and 1-p that 
a
h and a' be drawn respectively. The incumbent observes a, , then he 
announces (and implements) the level of taxes. Voting, if any, occurs before 
the end of the period. Early in the following period, voters can observe the 
values of a( and #(. Moreover, the winner of the election (if any) takes office. 
Then the information cycle starts again. 
In period 1 -the election period-, voters, after observing T, , form beliefs 
about the value of a, . Define pfr,) to be the conditional probability that 
voters assign to the event ja, = a*}. Voters with inference p(T,) elect the 
candidate that provides them with the highest expected discounted utility. 
Thus, if v(p(Tj)) is voters' electoral action (so that v(.) = 1 means vote for the 
incumbent), then 
The incumbent knows p(x,). In particular, he knows how this function 
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of taxes, he can influence voters' expected welfare and thus their voting 
actions. Then the incumbent's conjectures of voters' electoral actions are 
equal to (27): 
With this information, a type /-incumbent's problem in period 1 is: 
where f = B{Q'' + /?}, is next period's expected welfare if he is reelected, 
X" = B{fi
0}, is next period's expected welfare if he is not reelected. 
Also assume that %
w - x" > 0 for all I e {/, //}. 
In a separating sequential equilibrium, the following is true: T', * x\ . Thus, 
an /-type incumbent never finds it optimal to mimic an //-type incumbent. So, by 
observing the level of taxes, voters become informed about the incumbent's type 
before they go to the polls. Moreover, in these circumstances a low-type incumbent 
finds it optimal to choose his full information level of taxes. Thus x\ = x*&[). 
The remaining problem is to determine the level of taxes that a high-type 
incumbent would choose. Under the assumption that voters always think they 
have a low-type incumbent, unless they observe the equilibrium choices of a 
high-type incumbent, the following holds: p(t) = 0 V x * x\. This assumption 
is helpful in characterizing the separating equilibria, but unfortunately there is 
still a myriad of them. 
However, if we further require that voters do not have the unsophisti-
cated belief that an incumbent has played dominated strategies, we can 
achieve a unique equilibrium. In an undominated separating equilibrium, an 
/i-type incumbent sets x, SO that: 




It is easy to show that x\ < x\(t>{) . Thus, at election time, an //-type 
incumbent will set the level of taxes (and public goods!) below their optimal 
level in an amount enough to make mimicry for the /-type incumbent 
unprofitable.
9 
max{/? + W{x,,£',)} + vfpfx,) x
w + d - v(p(D)) X
n .  (29) 
(30) 
9 In thediscussion above we have not considered the possibility of pooling equilibria. 
Under certain conditions, pooling equilibria may be ruled out by using the intuitive 
equilibrium refinement. See Rogoff (1990) for more details. M ACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS 189 
In the formulation of the model above, only economic factors determine 
the outcome of an election. But this need not be so. For instance, Rogoff's (1990) 
model includes factors such as the popularity and looks of the candidates. 
In equilibrium, these factors would affect the results quantitatively; however, 
they do not greatly change the results reported above. 
Note also that in the analysis above it was assumed that there were 
only two types of incumbents. This assumption resulted in a limited 
variability of taxes and government expenditures. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
meet this criticism by developing a model with a continuum of types. As 
one would expect, in the equilibrium of their model, taxes fluctuate in a 
continuum range. 
4.2. Problems with Rogoff's Model 
One important omission in Rogoff's analysis is the consideration of redistribu¬
tive issues. Obviously, in order to address these redistributive issues in a 
sensible way, we need a model with heterogeneous agents. The extension of 
Rogoff's analysis to address these issues may be very important given the 
strong microfoundations of his analysis. 
In Rogoff's formulation there is no fundamental state variable linking 
different administrations and generations over time. In his model, a par-
ticular incumbent does not have incentives to deviate from socially op-
timal policies, except at election time. This characteristic of the model 
limits its usefulness in addressing issues such as the burden of the debt 
and intergenerational equity; moreover, the strategic interaction between 
the current incumbent and future administrations in his model seems 
trivial. However, with all fairness one should note that the introduction of 
such a state variable (i.e. capital) would tremendously complicate the 
solution of the model and thus overshadow any potential gains from 
addressing such issues in the context of this model. 
5. Elections, Macroeconomic Policies and the Open Economy 
All of the previous studies we have reviewed center their attention on the 
closed economy case. This situation could be misleading, since one of the 
most striking developments of the last fifty years has been the international 
integration of national economies. This fact opens the possibility of what 
Tufte (1978) calls an international electoral-economic cycle. Below we 
review some of the works that address the issue of elections and the 
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5.1. Exchange Rate Dynamics and Elections 
There is some evidence that the behavior of exchange rates is sensitive to 
electoral processes, because elections may bring about a change in economic 
policy. Hansson (1988), building upon the partisan theory of economic cycles 
described before, studies the effects of political events on the behavior of 
exchange rates. With this purpose, he uses a two-party version of Buiter and 
Miller's (1983) framework. Hansson assumes that political parties are charac-
terized by different tastes regarding monetary growth (and inflation). As a 
result, he is able to generate a partisan cycle in which the election of a tight 
money (loose money) government would generate a period of appreciation 
(depreciation) of the domestic currency. 
Hansson's results are not surprising since, by construction, the long-run 
exchange rate is determined by monetary factors only. Thus, any difference in 
the long-run rates of growth of the money supply would generate those kinds 
of effects. Hansson omits from his analysis, however, the study of the effects 
of fiscal policy over exchange rates. Obviously, one needs to develop a model 
in which the current account is determined in more detail. New capital asset 
pricing models have these features and should be used to address these issues. 
5.2. International Policy Coordination and Elections 
There is wide interest in studying the desirability or undesirability of inter-
national policy coordination. Domestic economic policy may have some 
external effects in other countries. Depending upon the nature of these effects, 
macroeconomic policy coordination may have positive effects on world wel-
fare. The issue of policy coordination has been discussed in the literature 
under the assumption that policymakers do not have to face electoral proces-
ses. This assumption can be misleading iince (as we have seen) elections may 
change the incentives and objectives of the policymakers currently in office. 
Therefore, the analysis of policy coordination in the context of political-
economic models can provide us with some important insights about 
the relevance (or irrelevance) of this problem. Indeed, Tabellini (1987) and 
Lohmann (1988) provide us with two examples of this kind of analysis. 
Tabellini (1987) studies the desirability of fiscal policy coordination in the 
context of consecutive administrations. In his model, the incumbent ad-
ministration knows that there is a positive probability that it will be replaced 
by anotheradministration which represents other interest groups. Becauseof this, 
the incumbent will try to influence the future administration's policies by gene-
rating current budget deficits (and thus debt) above socially optimal levels.
1
0 
See, for instance, Persson and Svensson (1989). MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS 191 
In an open economy, higher deficits imply a suboptimal path for the real 
exchange rate; therefore there is an endogenous mechanism that puts a limit 
on the magnitude of the budget deficits. International policy coordination, in 
this context, allows the policymakers of the different countries to relax this 
limit. Indeed, current policymakers of the different countries can form a 
coalition with no participation of future policymakers. The coalition's goal is 
to eliminate or reduce the adverse effects of budget deficits on real exchange 
rates.
1
1 Thus, international policy coordination can be socially undesirable. 
Obviously, Tabellini's finding hinges upon the particular kind of externality 
resulting from political competition: his analysis centers only on the case of a 
positive externality. 
Lohmann (1988) analyzes policy coordination in the context of a 
monetary model. She finds that international cooperation aggravates the 
amplitude of political business cycles; therefore, the pursuit of policy coor-
dination may not be socially desirable. Let's take a closer look at Lohmann's 
analysis. 
The model she uses incorporates partisan competition to Rogoff's (1985) 
model. In her model, there are two countries in the world economy: home and 
foreign. Both countries are identical in everything except in their political 
configuration. Lohmann assumes that the foreign country is ruled by a 
benevolent dictator, whereas home is ruled by elected policymakers. At home, 
there are two political parties and elections take place on a regular basis (i.e. 
every-other period). Political parties at home have preferences regarding 
inflation and terms of trade. One party dislikes inflation more than the other 
one. Under these conditions Lohmann shows that, in the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium, the loose money (tight money) government has to set the money 
supply growth rate at a higher (lower) level than in the case in which elections 
are never held. 
In the above context, international coordination has two opposite effects: 
it reduces the deflationary bias resulting from the terms of trade objective, but 
it also increases the international transmission and amplitude of the electoral 
cycles. Therefore, international cooperation could be counterproductive. 
Are these findings surprising? No, because they are a direct result of the 
objective functions assumed for the policymakers. Indeed, Canzoneri and 
Henderson (1988) show that most of the results obtained in the policy coor-
dination literature are very sensitive to these objective functions. Lohmann's 
and Tabellini's studies are not free of this problem. In order to avoid such 
1
1 Tabellini's findings have a direct antecedent in Rogoff's (1985) analysis. Rogoff 
found that policy coordination can be counterproductive, and that competition (rather 
than coordination) between governments may have some positive effects on mitigating 
each government's credibility vis-a-vis the private sector. 192 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
problems, one would like to see the microfoundations of the models fully 
spelled out (instead of assuming ad-hoc objective functions). This issue is even 
more important when one desires to do normative analysis. 
6. Whither Now? 
The models we have reviewed above make empirical predictions that could 
be readily implemented. There has been some work in this direction; in 
particular, Alesina (1988a and 1989) makes some tests for the partisan theory 
as well as for the budget cycles theory. He finds that neither theory is rejected 
by the tests he conducts. However, there is a problem in conducting empirical 
studies in this area since elections are very infrequent events, and hence there 
are small data sets. For this reason, the empirical results tend to be nonrobust. 
One way to get around this problem is to conduct cross-country studies. 
However, countries have different political systems. In particular, countries 
differ with respect to the timing of elections, that is the number of times an 
incumbent can run for reelection, and the (length of) tenure of the incumbent 
in office. The introduction of these issues in the models we have surveyed can 
bring about equilibria (and thus predictions) different from the ones we have 
described. For instance, Terrones (1989) -using Rogoff's framework- studies 
the macroeconomic equilibria for two countries that are identical except for 
the timing of elections. He shows that macroeconomic policy cycles are more 
pronounced in an electoral system with fixed-term elections (such as in the 
U.S.A. and Mexico) than in one with endogenous elections (such as in Japan, 
U.K., and most parliamentary democracies). The intuition behind this result 
is that, in an endogenous elections time framework, calling for an early 
election constitutes a partial signal about the incumbent's competency. Be-
cause of this, incumbents tend to manipulate economic policy in a lower 
magnitude than in the fixed-term election case. An implication of this analysis 
is that incumbents (in an endogenous elections system) tend to behave oppor-
tunistically: elections tend to be held in good times (i.e., when economic 
conditions are good). Empirically there is strong evidence of such behavior 
for the Japanese case (see, for instance, Ito, 1989 and Terrones, 1989). These 
results suggest that conducting comparative studies without paying due 
attention to the institutional differences of each country could be misleading. 
These issues aside, there is agreement that progress in the political-economic 
literature has to come from the systematic testing of the diverse theoretical 
models we have surveyed. 
Another area awaiting development is the normative one. It has been 
argued that elections are costly for societies since they provide incentives to 
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some economic benefits. They provide voters with an efficient means of 
eliminating incompetent policymakers. Moreover, elections provide different 
groups with the opportunity to further their economic interests without 
resorting to violent means. Thus, one would like to know how to improve the 
economic performance of a democracy. In particular, one would like to deter-
mine the costs and benefits of the different institutional arrangements. 
For instance, when one compares a society with fixed-term elections to one 
with endogenous elections, one finds that in the latter macroeconomic policy 
cycles are less pronounced but more frequent. From this, can we say that 
a society with an endogenous elections system is better off than one with 
fixed-term elections? Like the previous question, there are many 
other unresolved issues. A review of the political constitutions of the major 
democracies in the Western hemisphere shows great variation with respect 
to the length of time that a particular administration can stay in office. Is 
there any economic reason for this? What are the economic effects of 
changing the length of tenure of an administration? Finally, is there any 
economic reason for putting limits on the number of times an incumbent 
can run for reelection? 
Answers to the above issues are important not only to improve the design 
of political institutions of existing mature democracies, but, more importantly, 
they could be very useful for designing political institutions in countries without 
any (or with little) electoral experience, such as the newly born democracies 
of the East, and the infant democracies of Latin America and Africa. 
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